Carnage, horror and hate, those handmaidens of violent extremism, finally returned to London on the morning of Thursday 8th July. On this occasion there is good reason to work on the assumption that this was the work of radical jihadists.

Within the hour, the intelligence and security services, together with the Metropolitan Police, set to work to determine who were the perpetrators, where they may be, what they plan to do next, when, where and how. The why seems self-evident. The words of another terrorist will be echoing in many minds: “You have to be lucky all the time. We need to be lucky just once.”

This time we ran out of luck. The scale of the tragedy may be less than that of 9 / 11, Bali or Madrid but that is academic. Monitoring the news reports on Thursday morning, several thoughts struck me. Let me share two straight away.

First, a rhetorical question: what on earth do the advocates of ID cards think could have been achieved in this instance?

Secondly, the terrorists will have observed the response to the hallmark synchronised multiple attacks. Let us assume that the bus bomb may have been intended as a fourth tube train attack. Nevertheless, the detonation in Tavistock Square, fortuitous or planned, increased the impact because people were heading for the buses once the underground system was shut down.

The military speak of a “target-rich environment”. That was London on Thursday, during and above all after the explosions. By late afternoon, the streets were full of office workers walking the streets, bridges and underpasses between the City and the mainline stations, whose concourses presented a spectacle to make your average psychopath’s mouth water.

Thinking back to Madrid, where ten bombs slaughtered almost two hundred innocent travellers, you have to ask: why did they not hit the London commuter stations or trains, either that morning, in the evening rush hour or next day? Some will pray that this was not some grotesque rehearsal for a still greater outrage in London or elsewhere in this country. Others, and this includes those responsible for safety and security of the commuting public, will be racing to check, revise and validate their contingency plans, threat and vulnerability assessments.

Railways and their associated facilities have been a pre-eminent focus for terrorist attention, bloodshed and mayhem for decades. There have been hostage incidents (the South Moluccans who seized control of a train in the Netherlands in 1975), hijacks (in Ireland in 2002), deliberate derailments and massacre of passengers (Angola in 2001), trackside bombs (in Russia and Turkey this year), use of chemical weapons (the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway (1995) … the list is worryingly all too long.

Between 1998 – 2003, 181 attacks were launched against trains and rail systems around the world. These claimed 431 lives. Madrid reached almost half that toll in one horrific hour. What scenes from hell could a few rucksacks or carrier bags have wrought at Waterloo on Thursday afternoon? Sketches and data of New York City’s Grand Central Station were found last year in the home of a foreign terrorist suspect in Spain. Plans of the London underground were seized from another jihadist. So we know Madrid was never intended to be the sole assault on rail commuters.

What are the classic counter-measures? The mantra includes fencing, lighting, CCTV, rubbish bins, signage, security patrols, staff training and passenger education. Let me take them in turn and mention a few more besides.

Fencing. Always a budget-stretcher, it makes sense to repair and replace fencing around rail facilities and infrastructure. A fence serves to delineate where trespass begins and can act as a delaying factor to an intruder. Fences can be alarmed.

Lighting. Security lighting with adequate lux levels is vital. Well placed, it can highlight the criminal, obscure the security guard and enhance surveillance camera performance.

CCTV. Apart from the time-honoured movement detection software, latest applications under development are designed to monitor spaces such as airport concourses, seeking unusual patterns of behaviour, unattended baggage and the like.

Portals. Although it is impractical to suggest the kind of individual processing, selection, screening and search techniques practised at airports, technology (millimetre wave imagers) is now available to scan the public for suicide bombing equipment as they enter rail and tube stations in the flows typical for this type of transport. In addition, explosive detection sensors can be employed at the same points.

Rubbish Bins. Wherever possible (and mindful of the cost) standard rubbish bins may be replaced with receptacles made of blast-resistant materials. These are generally effective in containing blast from ordnance up to 1kg TNT equivalent. Although the devices used on Thursday were up to 4 ½ kgs, the aim in replacing bins is to deprive the terrorist of further gratuitous opportunities.

Signage. To increase public awareness concerning the dangers of unattended packages, evacuation procedures and restricted areas, clear and simple signs need to be displayed with care.

Security Patrols. Uniformed and plain clothes patrolling is essential both to reassure the public and deter potential miscreants. Combined with CCTV, patrols (including around the outside of premises) offer some hope of recognising the early stages of surveillance, a terrorist prerequisite. Dogs trained to detect explosives add a decisive advantage.

Baggage Searches. Random checks on bags, rucksacks and all forms of luggage can be conducted, pending development of techniques and equipment to enable automatic scanning of all baggage within acceptable time parameters. Staff need to be trained to identify improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Staff Training. Inculcating the ability to recognise and identify suspicious behaviour patterns, the action to be taken on finding suspect luggage, and improving emergency response are important areas to focus on. In the moments following an explosion, those not dead or badly injured will at the least be frightened, disoriented and in shock. Minimising panic is vital. Training staff in what to expect (what they will see and hear) can greatly assist in enabling them to deal effectively with the situation. It can also help them to understand, anticipate and cope with PTSD.

Educating the Public. Any steps to raise public awareness and vigilance, while not arousing undue concern, are to be encouraged. Having people on-side and acting as additional eyes and ears, even beyond the immediate confines of the rail station, is a potent force multiplier.

A group purporting to be linked to Al Quaeda (AQ) has claimed responsibility for Thursday’s atrocity. AQ has a track record of returning to the same country for follow-on attack, sometimes within days. There is a paramount need for the highest level of vigilance by rail staff and public alike.

Chris Hughes
8th July 2005

The author works for Drum Cussac, a specialist risk and security consultancy approved by the DfT, MCA and IMO. Drum Cussac is the first security consultancy accredited by Link-Up.